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Abstract: The strikes’ literature is dominated by the causes and effects of strike action as 
they relate directly to strikers themselves.  This paper considers another important group 
of affected workers – those individuals incidentally made idle as a result of the strike 
action of others. Using a unique data set of the British Engineering Employers’ 
Federation (EEF), it examines the years 1960 to 1970, a critical period in Britain’s post-
war strikes’ history. The mid-point of this decade marked the start of the era of the 
‘British Disease’, a universally adopted title given to Britain’s perceived international 
leadership in strikes incidence and industrial unrest. Workers made idle were an 
important symptom of the disease. In the study here, they accounted for 72% of days lost 
in disputes in which they were involved and 44% of total days lost in all disputes. 
Consideration is given to the likely causes of these incidental layoffs within 7130 strikes 
of EEF federated firms covering engineering, automotive and metal industries.  Particular 
attention is given to the British car industry, accounting for 22% of total EEF strikes 
during the period of study. The regression analysis examines the causes of workers being 
made idle with explanatory variables covering labour market conditions, strikes 
durations, pay issues, non-pay issues.  The regressions also control for company, union, 
geographical districts, annual and seasonal fixed effects. 
 
Key Words: Strikes, workers made idle, pay disputes, non-pay disputes 
 
JEL Classification: J52, L61, L62 
 
Acknowledgements: Research was funded by ESRC Grant RES-000-22-1804. I am 
grateful to the Engineering Employers Federation for allowing access to their payroll 
statistics. I am also grateful to Warwick University Modern Record Centre and to the 
Glasgow University Archive Centre for their considerable help in assembling the 
material.  This work has greatly benefited from the inputs of Andrew Currall and Daniel 
Currall who transcribed the data and from Elizabeth Roberts who provided excellent 
research assistance.   
 
 1
1. Introduction 
 
The nadir of post-war British industrial relations was reached in the 1970s/early 
1980s.  The related events were popularly referred to throughout the industrial world as 
the ‘British Disease’.  While this term referred to strikes and industrial unrest1, it was 
more generally associated with a decline of British manufacturing industry.  This ranged 
from falling international competitiveness through to the weakness and eventual collapse 
of some large-scale companies. Prominent among the latter was the effective elimination 
of the British motor car industry.  In fact, the year 1964 marked the start of the era of 
extreme industrial relations turbulence in Britain.  Over the period of Harold Wilson’s 
labour government of 1964 to 1970, there was exceptional growth in strike incidence. 
The associated working days lost were, apart from the short event of the General Strike in 
1926, unmatched over the previous 50 years.   
Using a unique data set that was originally compiled by the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation (EEF)2, this paper concentrates on a highly significant group of 
                                                 
1 British Disease: the pattern of strikes and industrial unrest in the 1970s and early 
1980s supposed by many during this time to be endemic in Britain and to weaken the 
British economy.  (English Collins Dictionary) 
 
2 The EEF is the largest employers' organisation in the United Kingdom with a current 
membership of nearly 6000 companies throughout the country. It was established in 1896 
and by 1899 had become known as the Engineering Employers' Federation. It later 
merged in 1918 with the National Employers' Federation and become known as the 
Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation. In 1961 it changed its name 
back to the Engineering Employers' Federation. It covers mainly engineering, metal 
working, and automotive companies. The company membership averaged about 4500 
over the period studied here (see Wigham, 1973, Appendix J). It accounted for between 
30% and 35% of total engineering industry employment.  One of the remarkable features 
of this organisation is that it compiled, on a thoroughly systematic basis, a complete 
strikes record for its member companies from 1920 to 1970 (Devereux and Hart, 2008). 
The data have recently been transcribed on to spreadsheets in a systematic fashion. They 
are available at the UK Data Archive: “An Evaluation of UK Engineering Strikes 
between 1920 and 1970”, SN 5841. 
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workers who symbolise one of the most damaging aspects of the British Disease.  These 
are non-striking workers who were incidentally laid off as the result of the strike action of 
others.  They are referred to in what follows as workers made idle. Days lost due to 
workers made idle account for 44% of total days lost in the 7130 EEF member strikes 
between 1960 and 1970.  If we confine attention only to company disputes in which 
workers were made idle, then this group account for 72% of total days lost.  
The total number of days lost due to strike action within a given company derives 
from three categories of workers.  First, days lost by strikers themselves.  Second, days 
lost by workers in the company who are not directly involved in strike action but who are 
consequentially made idle.  Third, days lost due to stoppages and disruptions in other 
branches of the affected company as well as other outside companies due to business and 
trading connectedness.3  The existing strikes literature has been overwhelmingly 
concerned with the first category of affected worker.  Unsurprisingly, there is little micro 
evidence on the third loss of working time because of the associated complexity of data 
requirements.  But even information on those within-company workers who are made idle 
by the strike action of others is difficult to obtain. The EEF strikes data offer insights into 
this aspect of the consequences of strike activity.    
Attention is concentrated on the 11 year period from 1960 to 1970 for three main 
reasons (see also Devereux and Hart, 2008).  First, as underlined in Figure 1, the second 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Turner, Clack and Roberts (1967, p54/55) give an example involving days lost through 
a combination of all three influences. It involved a 1960s British Motor Corporation 
(BMC) dispute in which a strike by less than 200 hoist operators led to a work stoppage 
of 6,000 other workers in the same plant and then to 8,000 operatives in other BMC 
plants being laid off.  Such a dispute may well have caused days lost in outside supply 
firms, information on which would have been very difficult to obtain. 
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half of this decade covers a period of historically high strikes incidence in engineering, 
car manufacture and other manufacturing industries.4  They mark the beginning of an era 
of strong union militancy within important sectors of British manufacturing.  Second, 
statistics for this period can be broken down into 54 engineering districts – mostly 
defining EEF travel-to-work areas – for which matching monthly unemployment rates are 
available. Thirdly and partly related to the foregoing, the data allow us to control 
comprehensively for company, union, geographical district and time fixed effects all of 
which have a strong bearing on the incidence of workers made idle.    
The paper is structured as follows.  The discussion in Section 2 suggests likely 
factors that result in workers being made idle due to the strike actions by others.   Section 
3 describes the EEF data.  The incidence of workers made idle within total strikes activity 
is featured in Section 4.  Associated estimation and results are contained in Section 5.  
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Workers made idle due to the strike action of others. 
 
In this section, I outline a number of likely explanations of why company strike 
activity may force non-participants to cease working.  I also indicate how the EEF strikes 
data help us to account or control for each of the eventualities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Figure 1 shows the incidence of strikes within EEF member companies over the period 
1920 to 1970. The late 1950s/early 1960s mark the start of an upturn in incidence which 
accelerated in 1965 and which by the late-1960s far exceed the incidence in the previous 
40 years.  The shape of the plot in Figure 1 is strongly indicative of British strikes’ 
activity over this period.  It holds for numbers of strikes in EEF companies and numbers 
of strikes in all industries (see Hart and Devereux, 2008, Figures 2a and 2b).  See also the 
evidence presented in Silver (1977). 
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(a) Production constraints and job task interdependence   
Table 1 lists the categories of pay and non-pay disputes recorded in the EEF data 
and categorised in the UK Date Archive.  The non-pay item, Production Constraints, 
concerns disputes involving interrupted work flow. Examples include ‘under-manning’, 
‘absenteeism causing extra work’, ‘alteration in the work sequence’, ‘problems with the 
work schedule’, ‘disruption due to line breakdowns’ and ‘poor work flow from other 
work groups’.  In work environments with highly interrelated production and job task 
sequences, where individual value added is highly dependent on outputs of others, 
disruptions may spread to work groups who are not directly involved in an initial 
localised dispute.  Line production is obviously vulnerable to such knock-on effects.  The 
most prominent example of line production is car assembly.5  Work disputes in a given 
segment of the line may well entail both downstream and upstream repercussions.  
Downstream sections will suffer from a disrupted production flow.  Upstream activity 
will be slowed down as bottlenecks accumulate.  Clearly, in these situations, the work 
patterns of individuals not immediately involved in strike action can be adversely 
affected.   In fact, the leverage effects of relatively small groups of strikers impacting on 
non-striking work colleagues can be quite substantial.   
The EEF data allow for a stringent test of the effects of production constraints on 
workers made idle relative to other non-pay disputes.  Thus, as well as incorporating a 
                                                 
5 Of the 189 disputes in the EEF data under the heading Production Constraints, 48% 
occurred within the British car industry.The British car companies in the EEF data are 
Austin Motor Co Ltd, BMC Ltd, British Leyland, Morris Motors Ltd., and Rolls Royce 
Ltd.  In all details referring to the car industry in what follows, I refer to these EEF 
member companies.  Also, I ignore issues concerning mergers, takeovers and 
rationalisations within the British car industry during this period.  I simply use the 
company names recorded by the EEF in its strikes’ records. 
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binary variable denoting this type of dispute, I can simultaneously account for individual 
company fixed effects which capture a broad set of production and organisational 
configurations. 
 
(b) Demarcation disputes 
The previous example involves disputes in which a given section of striking 
workers can make non-strikers idle because of production and organisational inter-
dependence across company workers. However, the possibility of a dispute arising in one 
section of a company having wider impacts on workers elsewhere is not restricted only to 
the issues raised above.  The non-pay category Job Demarcation in Table 1 provides an 
additional possibility.  Demarcation disputes refer to disagreements between different 
unions representing workers in the company, or between workers in the same union, over 
the allocation of work across different categories of workers.  So, for example, a 
demarcation dispute may involve objections – often via a representative union - by one 
category of worker to the employment of other categories of workers on given job tasks 
because they are alleged to lack the appropriate skills.6  A strike by workers who feel that 
they alone should undertake the work in question may lead to the disputed parties being 
made idle.7  Alternatively, and with the same possibility of outcome, an aggrieved 
                                                 
6 Specific examples of such disputes in the EEF data include objections to (i) labourers 
being employed on plate moulding, (ii) the class of worker being employed on 
coreblowing machines, (iii) the employment of youths in certain job tasks, (iv) the 
employment of semiskilled labour on sandslinging machines, (v) the class of labour 
employed on metal pattern machining.  
 
7 In fact, such objections may arise while a group of workers are actually on strike.  In the 
EEF data, for example, there is a case of a dispute involving the claim that non-testers 
handled work while testers were on strike. 
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category of workers may take strike action because they consider that they are being 
required to perform job tasks that should be undertaken by work colleagues working 
under different job descriptions.   
What was the potential for inter-union demarcation disputes within EEF 
companies?  Table 2 shows the frequency distributions of numbers of unions operating in 
EEF member companies in which strikes occurred over the period.  Within all companies, 
about 33% of striking companies experienced 2 or more unions representing their 
workforces.  In car companies, this latter figure was almost double at 63%.  There were 
385 incidents involving demarcation issues of which 17% involved car companies.   
 
(c) Strikes’ durations.   
We might expect that the incidence of workers made idle will correlate with strike 
durations.  It is not clear, a priori, whether correlation will be negative or positive. Why 
might we find a negative association?  First, strikers may attempt to spread the scope of 
the dispute, including deliberately making non-strikers idle, in order to increase the 
strike’s economic impact on the company.  This may have the result of weakening 
management’s resolve to resist strike demands.  Second, those workers who are made 
idle, for whatever reason, may exert pressure on strikers to reach a settlement of the 
dispute because of loss of income. Why might we find a positive association? Where 
strikes become protracted, workers may eventually be made idle as the lack of work flow 
from strikers increasingly limits the ability of non-strikers to execute job tasks. If 
maintenance workers go on strike, prolonged failure to deal with machine breakdowns 
will eventually seriously disrupt the work activity of machinists.  If workers responsible 
for intermediate production and/or partly finished goods and/or replacement parts go on 
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strike then this will eventually freeze the work activities of those whose jobs depend on 
the related supplies.  
While the EEF data record the timing of the start of each strike as well as strike 
duration in days, there is clearly an endogeneity issue with this variable.  Some of the 
foregoing arguments can be cast in terms of duration causing workers to be made idle or 
in terms of workers made idle affecting duration outcomes. The duration variable needs 
to be instrumented.  The method of instrumentation is discussed in Section 5. 
 
(d) The timing of strikes   
In general terms, it is important to check whether trend and seasonal factors relate 
to strike activity, including workers made idle.  Annual and monthly dummy variables are 
included to ‘control’ for these influences.  But are there potential cyclical influences?  
Based on the EEF strikes data, Hart and Devereux (2008) find that successful strike 
outcomes, from the viewpoint of engineering unions and workers, are pro-cyclical.  It 
might be expected that favourable outcomes are more likely to be achieved near to the 
peak of a cycle when company order books are full.  The risks attached to taking strike 
action may increase towards cyclical troughs as outside labour market options for 
potential strikers become relatively scarce.   Also, companies may be less likely to 
respond if, in any event, order books are thin and spare production capacity is high.  If 
some unions attempt to press home advantages by strategically widening disputes to non-
striking company workers in order to increase related costs to the employer then cyclical 
impacts may also positively relate to the incidences of workers made idle.   
The EEF data allow us to measure relative demand pressures – both across 
engineering geographical districts and through time – through the availability of detailed 
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district-level unemployment rates.  At the same time, union fixed effects allow us to 
control for relative union militancy. 
 
(e) Militancy 
Some unions, industries and geographical districts are linked with strike 
militancy.  This may relate variously to such factors as political affiliation, social 
infrastructure, workplace conditions, management attitudes, and local workforce 
tradition. Militancy is likely to relate to the incidence of workers made idle.  For 
example, militant union leadership in a given company dispute may seek to achieve 
widespread worker solidarity.  
Militancy may manifest itself through the frequency of strike action in particular 
geographical areas. Here the British car industry has a particularly notable record during 
our study period (see Table 4).  Where high and persistent strike frequencies occur, 
radical strike behaviour may be common among local working communities and may 
include pressurizing non-striking workers into joining on-going disputes or perhaps 
initiating direct action to halt continued work activity by non-strikers.  Such possibilities 
underline the need to incorporate company, union and district fixed effects in work of this 
type. 
3.  Data 
As shown in Figure 2, EEF strikes are dominated by disputes involving blue-
collar workers.8  The EEF coverage of each individual strike is comprehensive. Thus, we 
obtain the name of the company involved, the union(s) involved, the geographical 
                                                 
8 These are referred to as ‘manual’ workers in the EEF data, with white-collar workers 
classified as ‘staff’. 
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engineering district (e.g. Coventry) 9, the cause of the strike, the outcome or resolution, 
the strike duration in days10 (with precise start and end dates), the numbers involved (by 
men, women and boys), the classes of workers involved (e.g. toolroom fitters, 
machinemen), whether or not the strike is in breach of procedures for avoiding disputes, 
and numbers of workers made idle as a result of the strike11.  The causes of strikes are 
divided into pay and non-pay issues. There are no censored durations in the EEF strikes 
records because all reported strikes had ended at the end of the data.   
From 1960 to 1970, the EEF averaged 4567 member companies.  Of these, 863 
were involved in at least one pay dispute and 762 were involved in at least one non-pay 
dispute.  In total, there were 3671 pay disputes and 3459 non-pay disputes.  Table 3 
summarises per-company frequency distributions of pay and non-pay disputes.  Clearly, 
the great majority of companies affected by strikes experienced less than 11 disputes over 
the period whereas on the right-tail of the distribution 16 companies were involved in 
more than 50 disputes over pay or non-pay issues.  The latter are listed in Table 4.  
Assembly and supply companies in the British car industry account for 100% of these 
high-frequency non-pay disputes and 70% of the high frequency pay-related disputes.  
This domination is even more remarkable given that the vast majority of car strikes 
occurred in the second half of the period.  This is shown in Figure 3 which graphs strike 
                                                 
9 Matching district-level unemployment rates are available in the electronic data base. 
 
10 For strikes lasting less than a day, durations are reported in hours. 
  
11 If a strike lasts for x days, the EEF records the number of strikers and the number of 
workers made idle as experiencing the same x-day durations.  This is unlikely to be true 
in all cases.  Some strikes are likely to involve workers being made idle at later stages; 
for example, the supply of intermediate goods and services may take time to dry up.  It 
may well be the case, therefore, that the numbers of reported working days lost due to 
non-direct layoffs may exceed actual layoffs. 
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incidence.  There is a clear ‘take-off’ in strike activity from 1964 throughout EEF 
member companies.  Among car companies, the incidence rose from under 5% of total 
strikes in the early 1960s to 30% by the end of the period. 
Summaries of the main issues involved in pay and non-pay strikes are shown in 
Table 1 together with their relative frequency over the 1960 to 1970 period.12   The 
percentage share of non-pay to total disputes year by year, as shown in Figure 4, is 
relatively stable over the period, at roughly 50% of all disputes.  In the car industry by 
contrast non-pay disputes account for about 70% of all disputes during the key 1965 – 
1970 period.   
In the following, I differentiate between the 7130 total recorded strikes and the 
1641 recorded car strikes.  
 
4 The relative importance of workers made idle within total days lost due to strikes 
For the years 1960 to 1970, let TDLt be the total days lost in all EEF strikes in 
year t.  The total can be decomposed into number of strikes, average number of workers 
laid off by strikes, and the average strike duration (Forchheimer, 1948 and Knowles 
1952).  Thus, we have 
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()1( TtTtTtt DNSTDL ++=  
where STt = total number of strikes in year t, TtN = average number of workers laid off per 
strike (i.e. strikers and workers made idle), TtD = average duration of strikes.   
                                                 
12 Brief specific details of pay or non-pay issues for each individual strike are available in 
the strikes’ database. 
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Similarly, let MDLt be the total days lost in year t due to workers made idle.  Then 
we have  
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()2( MtMtMtt DMSMDL ++=  
 
where SMt = total number of strikes in year t that include workers made idle,  MtM = 
average number of workers made idle in SMt, MtD = average duration of strikes involving 
workers made idle. 
Figure 5 graphs the contributory shares in expression (1) while Figure 6 shows the 
equivalent outcomes in respect of expression (2).   Comparing these Figures, the major 
differences are (a) the number of strikes is the major contributory factor to total days lost 
in Figure 5 and (b) the average numbers of workers made idle contribute most to total 
days lost in Figure 6.  This underlines the fact that workers made idle comprise 
significant proportions of total days lost within strikes in which they occur.  The average 
duration of strikes are roughly comparable in both figures, as can be checked by 
consulting Table 5 which breaks strikes durations into all disputes as well as pay and non-
pay disputes. Note, however, that the size of strikes – measured in terms of total workers 
laid-off – are considerably larger if workers made idle are involved.  
The percentage of total working days lost due to workers made idle is given by 
)]ln()exp[ln(.100 tt TDLMDL −  and presented in Figure 7 for all companies and for car 
companies separately.13  Days lost due to workers made idle accounted for an average of 
                                                 
13 Car companies are omitted before 1965 because they accounted for relatively very few 
strikes (see Figure 3). 
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44% of total days lost in all companies between 1960 and 1970.14  In car companies 
between 1965 and 1970 workers made idle accounted for 68% of total days lost.  The 
peak occurred in 1967 when 83% of total working days lost in British car manufacture 
were accounted for by workers made idle.  In fact, 57% of total disputes in car plants 
between these dates involved workers made idle.  But these percentages under represent 
the true impacts of workers made idle.  Figure 8 confines attention to strikes that include 
workers made idle. Workers made idle average 72% of total days lost in such companies 
from 1960 to 1970.  In every year from 1962 to 1967, workers made idle accounted for 
over 80% of total days lost in these companies.15  In the late 1960s there was a decline 
from these extraordinarily high percentages culminating in 1970 when 57% of days lost 
in company strikes involving workers made idle were accounted for by such workers.  In 
general, the overall leverage effects on total time lost due to workers made idle were 
clearly substantial.  
 
5. Regression specifications and findings 
I now make use of the complete data to test for the main factors that affect the 
probability of strikes including workers made idle.  In particular, I test directly for the 
influences that are suggested in Section 2, while controlling for company, union, district 
and time (annual and monthly) fixed effects.  These are clearly a highly detailed and 
wide-ranging set of controls and so tests of the significance of individual issues are 
especially stringent. 
                                                 
14 The annual average of total days lost is 1.1 million days, with a trough of 0.6 million 
days in 1961 and a peak of 2.2 million days in 1970.   
 
15 Given the extremely high incidence of workers made idle in car company disputes 
between 1965 and 1970, the car graph in Figure 8 differs little from that in Figure 7. 
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First, consider pay-related strikes, with the pay issues listed in Table 3. Let MP = 
1 if a given pay-related strike involves workers made idle and MP = 0 if only direct 
strikers are involved.  Then, using a simple linear probability specification16, and in terms 
of strike i in engineering district d at time t, the regression equation takes the form 
 
idt
idtdtidtidt
DummiesMonth
DummiesYearDummiesDistrictDummiesUnion
DummiesCompanyIssuesPayUDMP
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ααα
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where Dˆ  is instrumented strike duration, U  is a district level unemployment rate17 and ε 
is an error term. 
Second, consider non-pay-related strikes, again itemised in Table 3.  Let MN = 1 
if a given non-pay-related strike involves workers made idle and MN = 0 if only direct 
strikers are involved.  Then the equivalent to (3) for this class of strikes is given by 
 
idt
idtdtidtidt
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How is the durations’ variable instrumented?  It turns out that the EEF data 
contain two strong instrumental variables.  The EEF had a laid down procedure for 
dealing with disputes arising in the workplace.  There was a somewhat convoluted 
                                                 
16 The choice is conditioned by the fact that the regressions control for company, union, 
district and time fixed effects and so fixed effects probits may be biased due to the 
incidental parameters problem (Greene, 2003). 
 
17 Given that more than one strike may occur in district r at time t, I cluster the standard 
errors in equations (3) and (4) at the year/month/district level in these regressions. I have 
verified that the analogous 2-step approach (e.g. Devereux, 2001) gives very similar 
estimates of coefficients and standard errors. 
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grievance formula under the so-called ‘provisions for avoiding disputes’.18  Turner, Clack 
and Roberts (1967), work out that in 1964/5 the average time between submitting a 
dispute to formal procedure and its final outcome – which may have ended-up with a 
failure by the parties to agree – averaged over 7 weeks in engineering cases and over 13 
weeks in car manufacturing cases. Exceptionally difficult cases could take over 6 months.  
Unsurprisingly, unions often favoured direct ‘unofficial’ negotiation with plant managers 
rather than risk a lengthy process that may eventually involve outside adjudicators.   
The EEF systematically recorded whether a given strike followed or was in 
breach of the laid-down provisions for avoiding disputes and reported outcomes 
separately for blue collar and white collar workers.  The contention here is that these 
variables are strong instruments for strikes durations.  It is likely that unions and workers 
were most likely to incur the time costs associated with following procedure if and only if 
they felt that a given dispute involved complex issues that were unlikely easily to be 
resolved at plant level.  By contrast if the details surrounding a dispute appeared a priori 
to be relatively simple and straightforward then it was probably deemed to be worthwhile 
to breach procedure and attempt to sort matters with local management.  Figure 9 reveals 
that this latter course of action was the one pursued by the large majorities of both blue- 
and white-collar workers.  Of course, the strategies of following or ignoring laid-down 
procedure could and did break down, resulting in strike activity. If ‘going through 
procedure’ signaled less tractable disputes then subsequent strikes would be expected to 
be longer than those in which procedure had been ignored because they were deemed 
                                                 
18 Depending on its degree of tractability, a given dispute could initially involve work 
floor foremen and then higher-level managers within the company and then proceed 
outside the company to relevant local unions and local employers associations and then, 
if necessary, to national union and representative employer levels. 
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simple enough to be solved at workshop level.  In fact, this outcome is confirmed in 
Table 6 which shows clearly that strikes occurring after laid-down procedure had taken 
place lasted considerably longer than strikes that breached procedure. 
In summary, whether or not procedure was followed among blue- and white-
collar workers in the period preceding a given strike offers a strong instrument for the 
strike duration variable.  In the first place, it is positively associated with the duration of 
the subsequent strikes.  Secondly, given that it involves procedural issues of negotiations 
that may or may not subsequently lead to strike actions, it seems highly reasonable to 
assume that it is will be independent of the error term in equation (3) or (4).  
Results to equation (3), covering pay disputes, are presented in Table 7.  Workers 
made idle are significantly positively related to strikes’ durations. However, the 
magnitude is small: a one day increase in duration is associated with an increased 
probability of workers made idle by just 0.007.  District unemployment rates have no 
statistical effect.  This would seem to rule out opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
strikers that is linked to the tightness of the labour market and that seeks to widen strike 
action to add pressure on employers.  In contrast, Devereux and Hart (2008) find, over 
the same time period, that strike resolutions are more favourable to unions when the 
unemployment rate is low.  Disputes over Piece Rates, affecting almost 13% of all pay 
disputes, is the excluded dummy in respect of pay issues. Only disputes over Bonuses and 
over Miscellaneous pay issues (see Table 1) display significant impacts on the probability 
of being made idle.  Both have positive influences. 
So, Table 7 provides limited evidence that pay-related issues impacted on the 
probability of strikes including workers made idle.  One problem is that wage disputes 
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account for, unsurprisingly, over half of all pay-related disputes and so it is difficult to 
discern – in the absence of much greater detail of the specifics of remuneration 
grievances – which aspects of pay are most likely to result in workers being made idle. 
By contrast, we see from Table 1 that there is no such predominant issue in respect of 
non-pay disputes. Also, there is a somewhat wider breakdown of total issues.  This might 
serve to give more ‘bite’ to the non-pay effects on workers made idle.  Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 10, while pay-related disputes within strikes in which workers were 
made idle predominated in the early years of our data, post-1963 there was a growth in 
the incidence of non-pay disputes culminating in a reversal of the relative importance of 
pay/non-pay disputes by 1965. This trend was especially apparent in the British car 
industry.  In fact, since the incidence of car strikes was low in the first-half of the period, 
it is clear that non-pay issues constituted easily the more important reason for strike 
action in this industry (see also Figure 4).   
Results in respect of non-pay issues are shown in Table 8.  As with pay disputes, 
the durations variable is significantly positive in the non-pay equation (4) but with almost 
twice the coefficient size.  Unemployment continues to display no impact, however.  The 
excluded non-pay issue is Treatment of Workers, accounting for 10% of non-pay 
disputes.  After the comprehensive control of fixed effects, disputes covering three non-
pay issues - Production Constraints, Job Demarcation and Redundancy - add 
significantly to the probability of workers being made idle.  As discussed in Sections 2 
(a) and 2(b) the first two types of strike issue involve the propensities of disputes to 
spread from an initial localised epicentre out to other work-sections of a company. The 
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third, involving worker redundancies, is not so straightforwardly explained.19  Finally, 
and again relative to the Treatment of Workers, disputes concerning Working Time are 
significantly associated with workers made idle.  There are 300 such disputes in the data 
and, once again, the car industry predominates, accounting for 45% of the total.  This 
issue, however, is associated with a lower probability of the strike involving workers 
made idle.  
 
6 Conclusions 
Using a unique data set on strike activity within the EEF, this paper offers one of 
the first insights into the phenomenon of workers made idle by the strike actions of 
others.  Member EEF companies represent core elements of British engineering, metal 
manufacturing and automotive industries and accounted for about one-third of total 
employment in these sectors. The analysis covers the period 1960 to 1970, a decade that 
marked an escalation of British industrial relations problems that were to last into the 
early 1980s.  Disruptions to production and associated production costs were greatly 
magnified in disputes that involved workers made idle.  In fact, they accounted for 
between three and four times the working days lost of those directly involved in strike 
actions.  Added to this, strikes involving workers made idle were relatively large scale 
(see Table 5).   
                                                 
19 There are 571 demarcation-related strike incidents in the EEF data involving 
disputes over redundancy.  Many of these involve workers protesting against the 
redundancy of others.  Of course, such workers constitute bone fide strikers. However, 
unless there is absolute solidarity within the company’s workforce, some workers will not 
want to join such a strike because they themselves are not directly affected by the issues 
at hand.  However, to the extent that the strike action is undertaken widely in the 
company then those who do not wish to take part may be unavoidably made-idle due to 
severe input and output disruptions. 
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The relative sizes of strikes involving workers made idle combined with the 
special ‘grievance issues’ among those affected served to make such strikes highly visible 
to the outside world and contributed to the popular notion of the British Disease.  No 
industry typified the Disease more than British car manufacture, an industry that suffered 
a prolonged terminal illness.  Car firms exhibited easily the highest frequencies of both 
pay and non-pay disputes (see Table 4) and were especially prone to disputes that 
embraced non-striking workers (see Figure 7).  Literature on the plight of the British car 
industry in the 1960s and beyond is dominated by descriptions of industrial relations 
problems that embraced union militancy, the power of shop stewards, and poor 
management practices.  Industrial relations issues almost certainly played a central role in 
the industry’s eventual demise.  But outcomes were exacerbated by an acute vulnerablity 
to widespread and costly disputes.  The dominance of interrelated job tasks and 
systematised production sequences served to increase the  risk that non-striking workers 
would be made idle.  Further, 63% of striking car companies had 2 or more representative 
unions, twice the norm among all EEF member companies. The presence of several 
unions within the workplace was a catalyst for disputes involving demarcation issues.  In 
fact 17% of demarcation strike incidents in our data involved car companies.  Such 
disputes are found here to be significantly related to the probability of workers made idle.   
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Figure 1  Strike incidence by companies in the EEF, 1920 - 1970
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Figure 2 Percentage of blue-collar strikes to all strikes
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Figure 3 Car strikes and total strikes in the EEF, 1960-1970
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Figure 4  Percentage of non-pay strikes to total strikes
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Figure 5  Total days lost in all EEF strikes
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Figure 6  Total days lost due to workers made idle
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
ln
ln(st rikes with workers made idle) ln(average number of workers made idle)
ln(average durat ion of st rikes with workers made idle)
 
 
 
 23
Figure 7 Percentage of total working days lost due to workers made idle
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Figire 8 Percentage of total working days lost due to workers made idle 
in strikes with made idle
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Figure 9  Percentages of blue-collar strikes and white-
collar strikes in breach of procedure
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Figure 10   Percentage of non-pay strikes to total strikes 
involving workers made idle
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Table 1  Causes of Pay and Non-Pay in EEF Strikes, 1960 - 1970 
Pay Disputes Relative 
frequency 
Non-Pay Disputes Relative 
Frequency 
Wages 
 
52.4 Wrongful Dismissal 12.3 
Bonuses 
 
16.9 Treatment of Workers 10.2 
Piece Rates 
 
12.9 Union-Related 7.5 
Overtime 
 
0.1 Redundancy 4.0 
Shift/Night Rates 
 
0.1 Use of Outside Labour 0.9 
Relative Pay 
 
3.1 Supervision/Management 4.4 
Systems of Pay 
 
5.0 Systems of Working Time 6.2 
Holiday Pay 
 
2.1 Apprentices 0.1 
Payment for Time Lost 
 
6.3 Job Demarcation 5.5 
Holiday Time 
 
0.3 Production Constraints 4.6 
Miscellaneous 
 
0.9 Sympathy with Others 3.3 
 
 
 Work Environment 10.2 
 
 
 Working Hours 7.6 
 
 
 Work Flexibility 10.4 
 
 
 Delay in/Refusal to Open 
Negotiation 
 
4.4 
 
 
 Attendance at Union Meetings 3.0 
 
 
 Miscellaneous 5.8 
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Table 2  Number of Unions Representing Workers in EEF Striking Companies, 
1960-1970 
Number of 
Unions 
All Companies 
% Frequency 
Car Companies 
% Frequency 
 
1 67.4 36.6 
2 16.9 29.3 
3 10.9 32.4 
4 2.7 1.0 
5-10 2.1 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 3  Frequency distributions of company pay and non-pay disputes, 1960 – 1970 
Disputes per Company Pay Disputes Non-Pay Disputes 
1 417 415 
2 – 5 314 261 
6 – 10 71 45 
11 – 20 34 24 
21 – 50 17 11 
51 – 100 7 1 
> 100 3 5 
Number of Companies 863 762 
Total Frequency 3671 3459 
Mean Frequency 4.25 4.5 
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Table 4  Companies with over 50 pay and/or non-pay disputes, 1960-1970  
Companies with a 
frequency greater 
than 50 
Pay Disputes 
(Frequency) 
Companies with a 
frequency greater 
than 50 
 
Non-Pay 
Disputes 
(Frequency) 
British Motor 
Corporation Ltd. 
 
189 British Motor 
Corporation Ltd. 
400 
British Leyland 
 
158 British Leyland 320 
Pressed Steel Fisher 
Ltd. 
 
107 
 
Pressed Steel Fisher 
Ltd. 
256 
Joseph Lucas Ltd. 
 
82 
 
Morris Motors Ltd. 157 
Hawker Siddeley 
Ltd. 
 
58 
 
Austin Motor Co. Ltd. 115 
Austin Motor Co. 
Ltd. 
 
56 
 
Rolls Royce Ltd. 51 
Rolls Royce Ltd. 
 
55 
 
  
Rover Co. Ltd. 53 
 
  
Plessey Co. Ltd. 51 
 
  
Smiths Industries 51 
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Table 5 Means and Medians of Strike Durations 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ALL COMPANIES
Duration 7 2 7.25 1.5 9.2 2.25 11 3 4.8 1.5 4.4 1
Size 352 89 820 330 325 70 942 325 379 106 726 332
CAR COMPANIES
Duration 2 0.75 1.5 0.5 3.1 1 2 0.8 1.4 0.5 1.2 0.5
Size 614 204 846 343 791 194 1226 432 521 213 660 322
All Strikes Pay-related strikes Non-pay strikes
All Strikes Strikes with Made IdleStrikes with Made IdleAll StrikesStrikes with Made IdleAll Strikes
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Table 6 Average strike durations and strikes in breach/not-in-breach of 
procedure 
 
    
 
Blue-collar in 
breach of 
procedure 
Blue-collar not 
in breach of 
procedure 
White-collar in 
breach of 
procedure 
White-collar 
not in breach 
of procedure 
 Average Strike durations (days) 
1960 8.0 15.0 14.6 58.7 
1961 7.8 25.4 27.5 95.0 
1962 8.3 19.1 16.7 41.0 
1963 7.6 17.4 6.8 36.7 
1964 6.1 19.1 8.3 37.9 
1965 3.7 18.2 4.5 18.3 
1966 2.7 6.4 5.9 23.9 
1967 4.1 14.6 4.8 15.5 
1968 4.4 14.8 7.0 97.3 
1969 3.0 22.3 5.8 37.8 
1970 4.4 16.3 9.6 24.4 
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Table 7   Results to Regression Equation (3) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ESTIMATED EFFECTS 
Dˆ  0.007* (0.003) 
 
U -0.007  (0.016) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.148  (0.175) 
PAY ISSUES §  
 
 
Wages 0.021 (0.032) 
 
Bonuses 0.085*  (0.036) 
 
Overtime -0.115  (0.152) 
 
Shift/Night rates 0.071  (0.085) 
 
Relative Pay 
 
-0.008  (0.050) 
 
Systems of Pay 0.032  (0.048) 
 
Holiday Pay -0.005  (0.049) 
 
Payment for Time Lost 0.038  (0.047) 
 
Holiday Time 0.111 (0.125) 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
0.186*  (0.095) 
Notes:  There are 3669 observations.  Regression includes dummies to control for union, 
district, company, year, and month fixed effects.  Standard errors in brackets.  * Denotes 
5% significance.  § Excluded pay issue is Piece Rates. 
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Table 8   Results to Regression Equation (4) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS 
Dˆ  0.013*  (0.005) 
 
U -0.004  (0.012) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.089  (0.284) 
NON-PAY ISSUES §  
 
Wrongful dismissal 0.049  (0.037) 
 
Union-related 0.039 (0.044) 
 
Redundancy 0.090* (0.046) 
 
Outside labour -0.003  (0.082) 
 
Supervision/management 0.012 (0.052) 
 
Systems of supervision 0.048  (0.047) 
 
Apprentices 0.127  (0.077) 
 
Demarcation 0.094*  (0.049) 
 
Production constraints 0.109*  (0.047) 
 
Sympathy with others -0.039  (0.059) 
 
Work environment 0.086  (0.046) 
 
Working hours -0.142*  (0.055) 
 
Work flexibility 0.042  ((0.041) 
 
Problem with negotiation 0.056  (0.050) 
 
Attendance at union meetings -0.050 (0.059) 
 
Miscellaneous 0.078  (0.051) 
 
Notes: There are 3347 observations.  Regression includes dummies to control for union, 
district, company, year, and month fixed effects.  Standard errors in brackets.  * Denotes 
5% significance.  §  Excluded pay issue is Treatment of Workers. 
 
